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THE NATURE OF LEADERSHIP* 
The Chinese Communists, 1930-1945 
By HENRY G. SCHWARZ* 
INTRODUCTION 
THE twentieth anniversary ofthe assumption of state power by the 
Chinese Communists is a convenient occasion to take stock of the 
many dramatic events that have taken place since that first day in 
October of 1949, when Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the new People's 
Republic of China. The anniversary, however, is more than a fortui- 
tous product of the Western calendar. It lies close to one of those con- 
vulsive periods that have jolted China from time to time and have 
caused major changes in the Chinese state and society. The creation of 
the People's Republic twenty ears ago was one such period. The Great 
Leap Forward of the late fifties was another, and the recent Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution may have been a third. Each of these 
events has substantially reshaped the state or society or both. From 
a historical point of view, the next major event that may well come 
shortly after the twentieth anniversary is the death of Mao Tse-tung 
and other co-founders of the Communist state. This anniversary, there- 
fore, offers an opportunity to reassess the record of the Chinese Com- 
munists ince 1949 with a view toward understanding the setting and 
the problems that the post-Mao leadership will soon inherit. 
Such a task cannot be complete, however, without a reassessment of 
the nature of leadership. Indeed, without studying the nature of leader- 
ship, we cannot understand much else of a totalitarian system where in 
theory and practice the Party leadership is both the originator and ex- 
ecutor of changes in all major aspects of the world's most populous 
country. 
Perhaps the most important among the leadership's many facets is 
the relations among the handful of men who until at least the cultural 
revolution have governed Communist China. Specifically, before we 
can understand China we must understand the relative influence of 
each of these men in the governing process. As to the identity of China's 
leadership, an almost limitless choice is open to the researcher, from 
the entire membership of the Communist Party to one man. This 
study designates the Political Bureau as the leadership although a 
* This paper was first presented at the Seventh International Conference on World 
Politics, Noordwijk, The Netherlands, August 31-September 6, i969. 
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study of the nature of leadership even of a highly structured political 
system such as Communist China may at times have to include leaders 
who are not members of the Political Bureau. Such methodological 
flexibility is even more necessary inany study of the Communist lead- 
ership before i949, when it was less structured and more in flux. 
Strange as it certainly is, after twenty ears of state power and almost 
fifty ears of existence of the Chinese Communist Party, not a single 
monograph as been written on this vitally important subject. The 
only book whose title promises to study the nature of leadership is 
John W. Lewis' Leadership in Communist China.1 But the title is 
misleading because, instead of analyzing the actual nature of leader- 
ship, it ably and comprehensively presents certain ideals of leadership 
as expounded in the Party's guidelines. This is not to say that China 
specialists have ignored the nature of leadership. Quite on the contrary, 
virtually every study of the Party and many studies on other subjects 
manifest their authors' conceptions of the leadership. In most cases, 
however, these conceptions are not treated in their own right. They 
are but images applied to the treatment ofsome other subject. As Isaacs 
and others have shown, images are acquired subconsciously and are 
seldom reliable. They are formed out of a variety of haphazardly ac- 
quired experiences, such as personal recollections oflife in China, bits 
and pieces of information acquired from scholarly and other works, 
seemingly relevant observations in other countries that are either Com- 
munist or Asian or economically underdeveloped orany combination 
thereof, and many others. 
No two China specialists have an identical image, but while there are 
many minor differences, most China specialists share one general image. 
I call this image quasi-collective. It shows policy issues as being threshed 
out in a frank and no-holds-barred manner among the seven men in 
the Standing Committee, ifnot quite so freely in the larger Political 
Bureau. Such leadership iscollective, but the prevailing image adds one 
important difference, in its depiction of Mao Tse-tung's influence as 
considerably greater than that of his co-leaders. Mao is envisaged as 
being more than first among equals in that his decision-making powers 
have presumably been relatively unencumbered bythe actions and opin- 
ions of other leaders. By virtue of explicitly superior prerogatives and 
of his own persuasive powers, Mao is seen as being able to influence the 
outcome of policy deliberations. Moreover, he and only he can imple- 
ment policies in ways somewhat divergent from the letter and the spirit 
1 Ithaca i963. 
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of these policies. In sum, the image projects a crossbreed between a col- 
lective and a fully hierarchical leadership. 
One basic shortcoming of this image is that it handles the concept of 
power in an undifferentiating manner. An excellent major work of re- 
cent years opens with the flat assertion that "Mao Tse-tung's rise to 
power is a well-known fact."2 By failing to dissect "power" and to sub- 
ject its myriad interacting facets to analysis, many scholars have been 
led to believe, erroneously in my opinion, that "power" will inevitably 
and in all political systems gravitate o one person. An analysis of lead- 
ership, based on "power," helps to bring about an image that comes at 
times perilously close to an all-or-nothing view. I suspect hat the con- 
cept of "power," taken as a whole, is too imposing to encourage dis- 
section. 
Professor Rue provides clear illustrations ofthis effect in relation to 
two cardinal aspects of leadership. On the problem of relations within 
the leadership, the focus of this study, Rue says that "the Seventh Con- 
gress [of April of 1945] was Mao's Congress of Victors. He had over- 
come all his enemies in the Chinese party."3 Categorical concepts breed 
more categorical concepts; "power" begets "enemies" and "victors." 
Of the almost infinite variety of internal relationships, that of "enemy" 
is only one but, admittedly, the most sharply delineated of all relation- 
ships. "Victors," which in the context of the sentence refers not to na- 
tional victors over the Japanese, whose defeat was certain in April of 
I945, but to intra-Party victors, isequally categorical. Itleaves no room 
for anything but its antithesis, the "vanquished." 
The concept of undifferentiated "power" embedded in the quasi- 
collective image also affects he analysis of leadership control over the 
Party hierarchy. Rue states that "after the Seventh Congress, Mao's 
power ested on two closely related factors. One was control of the party 
apparatus; the other was the belief of other leaders of the Chinese party 
that his political line was correct and that his thought was the best rep- 
resentative ofMarxist-Leninist ideology in China."4 I shall elaborate 
later on the merits of this statement. For the time being, it will suffice 
to point out that Mao is portrayed, as in the description fintra-leader- 
ship relations, asbeing much more than first among equals. He, and 
only he, had "control of the party apparatus." 
Another fundamental shortcoming ofthe quasi-collective image is 
its reliance on documentary evidence that is either skimpy or altogether 
2John E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung In Opposition, 1927-1935 (Stanford i966), i. 
3lbid., 4. 4Ibid., 5. 
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lacking. A representative sample of this shortcoming is supplied by 
Professor Lindbeck, who asserts that "for thirty ears, Mao Tse-tung 
has firmly presided over the party and is its undisputed leader. Its key 
figures clearly are his men." This sweeping statement is supported by 
only one piece of "evidence," namely, the assertion that "almost all of 
the senior men and the majority of the Central Committee members 
shared the Long March of 1934-35 with him."5 This view is untenable 
for two elementary reasons. First, the idea of a causal link between 
participation i the Long March and the nature of leadership in the 
mid-sixties is questionable. Itplaces upon the Long March an impor- 
tance Lindbeck fails to demonstrate. S cond, the content of the quoted 
sentence isfalse. If we assume that "senior men" refers to the Political 
Bureau elected at the first and second sessions of the Eighth Party Con- 
gress, the record shows that only fifteen of the twenty-six members and 
alternate members hared the Long March with Mao. They could 
hardly be said to constitute "almost all" of the Political Bureau. More- 
over, a look at any biographical dictionary such as Who's Who in Com- 
munist China6 will inform the reader that only about forty-three of 
the ninety-seven members of the Eighth Central Committee marched 
with Mao in 1934-35. 
Professor Lindbeck elevates Mao's position even further when he 
maintains, without offering any documentary evidence, that "it has 
been his authority, his statement of values and doctrines, and his men 
that have permeated the party and built it from a regional band of 
40,000 members in 1937 to 17 million in i962 and perhaps 20 million 
by i965. Factionalism, regionalism, and competing loyalties have not 
been allowed to emerge or have been quickly suppressed by the deter- 
mined and powerful group that runs the party."' 
The image of a quasi-collective leadership has survived the onslaught 
of events that should at least have elicited its reassessment. During the 
height of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in i966 and i967, 
the Mao group hurled countless accusations against virtually every 
member of the Party leadership. The most important implication com- 
mon to almost all the accusations was that at no time during the last 
thirty ears were the Party leaders united in their aims and motivations 
and that during most of those years Mao Tse-tung did not occupy the 
superior position assumed by many China specialists. 
5 J. M. H. Lindbeck, "Transformations in the Chinese Communist Party," in Donald 
W. Treadgold, ed., Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Dibferences 
(Seattle i967), 78. 
6 Hong Kong i966. 7 Treadgold, 79. 
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These revelations have so far failed to cause most China specialists 
to call into question their image of a quasi-collective leadership. While 
acknowledging acute disunity within the Party leadership since the 
outbreak of the cultural revolution, most scholars till seem to adhere 
to this image. Some explicitly reaffirm their view that since at least 
his assumption of state power in 1949, Mao Tse-tung has been the 
supreme decision-maker. Others dismiss recent charges of anti-Mao 
actions made by the Mao group against Liu Shao-ch'i and many other 
leaders as ex post facto. In essence, their argument runs as follows: 
the actions Liu Shao-ch'i s today accused of having perpetrated at
various times of his career are, in so far as they had occurred at all, 
crimes by the current s andards of the Mao group but were in line with 
Party policies at the time they are said to have been made. It does 
not seem to occur to many that while this argument is quite true as 
far as it goes, it begs the question of who had been chiefly responsible 
for formulating those policies. 
Still others maintain that Mao Tse-tung is possibly understating his 
influence in the years prior to i966 in order to strengthen his case 
against Liu Shao-ch'i and other leaders. Such argument, however, 
is both questionable and wholly incapable of verification at present. 
If Mao were actually planning to undercut his opponents in this man- 
ner, he must rationally have expected to gain support from the polit- 
ical, economic, and military professionals without whom state and 
society could not function. Yet, if this had indeed been Mao's motive, 
his very tactic would tend to support exactly the opposite of what has 
been assumed. Put differently, it would give credibility ohis present 
claim that he had not been the undisputed leader and, therefore, 
would undermine the validity of the image of a quasi-collective lead- 
ership. 
Finally, some argue that Mao Tse-tung isunderplaying his allegedly 
superior decision-making powers in previous years in order to draw 
strength from his supposedly great esteem among the nonprofessional 
majority of the population. Leaving aside Mao's popularity, which is 
open to doubt, we are led to the conclusion that an appeal for mass 
support, as in fact Mao made during the cultural revolution, forces 
the proponents of this particular thesis into an untenable position. If 
Mao had indeed been the unchallengeable l ader of the Party, he 
would not have had to rely on the overthrow ofParty leaders through 
mob violence. 
The image of a quasi-collective leadership has also successfully with- 
stood contrary evidence for the period before 1949. Professor Lindbeck 
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fairly represents he opinion of many China specialists hat Mao has 
held the supreme position in the Party since the mid-thirties-since th
Tsunyi Conference inJanuary of I935. Professor Lindbeck, as quoted 
earlier, said in i965 that Mao had been the "undisputed leader" of the 
Party for thirty ears. General Griffith, to cite a second representative 
sample, averred in i967-that is, after the outbreak of the cultural 
revolution-that "at [the Tsunyi] conference, Mao mustered enough 
support o gain the unchallengeable position which is still his."8 
There can, of course, be no doubt that the insurrectionary period 
was of unusual significance inthe history of the Chinese Communist 
movement. Almost thirty ears intervened between the founding of 
the Party in i92i and its rise to supreme state power in Mainland 
China in 1949. This period was longer than the insurrectionary periods 
of all the other Communist parties that now rule states. The Chinese 
Party also distinguishes it elf rom all the others by its long experience 
in the techniques of government inits many base areas between I928 
and I949. 
It is clear, therefore, that the nature of leadership during the past 
twenty ears was profoundly influenced by events during a period of 
roughly equal length before i949. As the title of this study suggests, 
I shall reassess the relationships within the Party's leadership during 
that period. The study is actually limited to the period between 1930 
and I945 because the two dates are convenient bench-marks. In I930, 
an important element, the Bolsheviks, was inserted into the Party 
and soon greatly altered the nature of leadership. In 1945, the Seventh 
Party Congress ratified the changes in the leadership that had taken 
place during the war against Japan, and it elected a new leadership 
that remained basically unchanged until long after its assumption of 
state power in I949. At certain key points, I shall compare representative 
samples of statements by China specialists with the known facts and 
offer an alternative interpretation. 
In the space available, it is impossible, of course, to present a full 
chronological treatment ofall relevant events between I930 and I945. 
I restrict this study, therefore, towhat I consider the most relevant 
events. 
THE KIANGSI PERIOD 
The Kiangsi period (I928-I934) marked the abandonment of the 
Party's almost decade-long attempt to start a revolution i  the cities. 
The Central Soviet Area in Southern Kiangsi, which was built prin- 
8 Samuel B. Griffith II, The Chinese People's Liberation Army (New York I967), 51. 
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cipally by Chu Te and Mao Tse-tung, was the first major testing- 
ground for Communist land policies under the aegis of a fully devel- 
oped government controlling several counties. 
For this study's purposes, the Kiangsi period's chief importance was 
the acute struggle for supremacy inthe Party between the group around 
Mao Tse-tung, Chu Te, and other leaders in the Central Soviet Area 
and the Central Committee in Shanghai, which became dominated 
by the so-called Twenty-eight Bolsheviks.9 They had been students at 
the Sun Yat-sen University inMoscow in the mid-twenties, and most 
of them returned to China in May of I930, accompanied by Pavel Mif, 
who had been the rector of Sun Yat-sen University. Li Li-san, the 
then general secretary ofthe Party, was removed from his position at 
the Third Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee in September of 
i930. His post was given to Hsiang Chung-fa, who was re-elected at
the Fourth Plenum in January of I93I.10 Reputedly a weak leader, he 
became surrounded by Bolsheviks and those who sided with them. 
Besides electing sixteen members and alternate members of the Polit- 
ical Bureau, this plenum also elected Ch'en Shao-yii, Ch'in Pang-hsien, 
Chou En-lai, Hsiang Chung-fa, nd K'ang Sheng to the Standing 
Committee of the Political Bureau, the highest organization in the 
Party." Ch'en and Ch'in were Bolsheviks, and the ever-adaptable Chou 
En-lai firmly supported them. The Bolsheviks' influence grew still 
stronger in September of 193i after Hsiang Chung-fa was arrested 
and executed by the central government and Ch'en Shao-yii was re- 
called to Moscow to become the Chinese Communists' representative 
in the Comintern. Two Bolsheviks filled their positions, Chang Wen- 
t'ien and Wang Yiin-ch'eng, and a third Bolshevik, Ch'in Pang-hsien, 
became the new general secretary of the Party."2 Besides, Bolsheviks 
9 Wang Chien-min lists them as follows: Chang Ch'in-ch'iu, Chang Wen-t'ien, 
Ch'en Ch'ang-hao, Ch'en Shao-yii, Ch'en Yuan-tao, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Chu A-ken, 
Chu Tzu-hsiun, Ho Tzu-shu, Hsia Hsi, Kuo Miao-ken, Li Chu-sheng, Meng Ch'ing- 
shu, Shen Tse-min, Sheng Ch'ung-liang, Sun Chi-min, Tu Tso-hsiang, Tu Yen, Wang 
Chia-hsiang, Wang Hsiu, Wang Pao-li, Wang Sheng-jung, Wang Sheng-ti, Wang 
Yuin-ch'eng, Yang Shang-k'un, Yin Chien, Yuan Chia-yung, and Yiin Yiijung. Wang 
Chien-min, Chungkuo kungch'antang shihkao [A History of the Chinese Communist 
Party] (Taipei I965), II, IOO. 
10 Hsiao Tso-liang, Power Relationships Within the Chinese Communist Movement, 
1930-34: A Study of Documents (Seattle I96I), I, II5; see also Wang, II, . 
11 According to Ch'en Shao-yii, as quoted by Kuo Hua-lun (Warren Kuo), in 
Feich'ing Yiiehpao (hereafter called FCYP), April I967, 95, and in Issues and Stud- 
ies (hereafter called IS), July I967, 41. See also Hsiao, I, II5. 
12Kuomintang, Investigation Section, Fenpeng lihsi chih kungch'antang [The Dis- 
integration of the Communist Party] (I93I), as quoted by Kuo in FCYP, July I966, 
III-I2, and in IS, October I966, 46. 
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took over the Central Committee's two most important departments, 
organization and propaganda.13 
Mao ranked rather low in the Party leadership at that time. In 1927, 
he had been expelled from his position as an alternate member of the 
Provisional Political Bureau for having contravened the Party's strate- 
gic plans while serving on the Hunan Provincial Committee.14 He may 
also have been removed from the Central Committee.'5 In the follow- 
ing year, however, when he was already ensconced in the mountains 
of Southern Kiangsi, the Sixth Party Congress, which met in Moscow, 
elected him (or re-elected, if he had in fact been removed in 1927) to 
the Central Committee but not to the Political Bureau. Mao had be- 
come sufficiently prominent in the rapidly expanding stronghold in 
Southern Kiangsi that in April of I930, Li Li-san, still the general 
secretary of the Party, appointed him as secretary of the newly es- 
tablished General Front Committee (tsung ch'ien wei). The officially 
stated function of this committee was to prepare and execute uprisings 
in Hunan, Hupei, and Kiangsi. 
The specific reason why Mao, and not someone else, was appointed 
as secretary of the General Front Committee was that he had attained 
a major position in the military. When in April of I928 he merged the 
forces who had gone with him to Chingkangshan from central Hunan 
with those of Chu Te, the two men formed the Fourth Red Army, a 
force of about io,ooo men. Chu became its commander and Mao its 
political commissar. In November of I928, a much smaller force, esti- 
mated at about i,ooo troops and called the Fifth Red Army, was formed 
by P'eng Te-huai near Chu's and Mao's Fourth Red Army in South- 
ern Kiangsi. A reorganization at the end of I929 saw the Fourth Red 
Army changed to the First Red Army Corps with Chu and Mao re- 
taining their positions as commander and political commissar."6 The 
last major military reorganization during the Kiangsi period took 
place in February of I930, when all forces operating in Southern 
Kiangsi and Southern Hunan were combined into the First Front 
Army. Once again, Chu Te was the commander and Mao Tse-tung the 
political commissar. 
Li Li-san ordered a general attack on the cities, but when the first 
13Wang, ii, 99. 
14 "Resolution of the Political Bureau on political discipline" (November I4, I927), 
Kuo-wen choupao, v, 3 (January I5, I928), 5-7, translated by Karl A. Wittfogel in his 
"The Legend of 'Maoism'," China Quarterly, ii (April-June i960), 32-33. 
15 Rue, 8i. 
16The Fifth Red Army was redesignated the Third Red Army Corps, with P'eng 
Te-huai remaining as commander. 
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attack on Ch'angsha turned into a fiasco, Mao refused to obey Li's 
order for a second attack. Despite this blatant disobedience, Mao did 
not lose rank nor was he, as far as we know, punished in any other 
way. 
It would be a mistake, however, to interpret hese events as proof 
that Mao had attained a position in the Party that was close to being un- 
challengeable. As we have seen, Li Li-san was facing, in the Bolsheviks, 
far more powerful and far more immediate opposition than Mao 
could have hoped to muster. That Li did not discipline Mao was prob- 
ably due to his attempt o ward off the Bolsheviks and to the great dis- 
tance between the Central Committee in Shanghai and the mountain 
fastness of Kiangsi which would have made any censure ineffectual. 
Moreover, Mao's struggle for supreme leadership within the Central 
Soviet Area was far from over. Toward the end of I930, his position 
was threatened by some leaders of the newly established Southwestern 
Kiangsi Soviet Government, which was placed under the jurisdiction 
of the Central Soviet Area.17 In late November or early December, 
Mao arrested several leaders who were suspected of being agents of 
the A-B (Anti-Bolshevik) League, including Tuan Liang-pi, Li Po- 
fang, and Chin Wang-pang.18 
As soon as Mao had removed this challenge, a more serious chal- 
lenge arose in Tungku in Southwestern Kiangsi, where on December 
8, I930, Liu Ti, the political commissar of the Twentieth Army, started 
the well-known Fut'ien Rebellion. He overthrew the Southwest 
Kiangsi Soviet government and arrested many of its leaders whom he 
suspected of being Mao's supporters. He also released Tuan Liang-pi 
and the others whom Mao had arrested a short time earlier. The rebels 
declared their support for Chu Te, P'eng Te-huai, and Huang Kung- 
liieh but they opposed Mao. Fortunately for Mao, the three leaders 
issued a joint statement supporting Mao and censuring the rebels. Fi- 
nally, the rebellion was crushed by P'eng's Third Red Army.'9 
The Third Plenum of the Central Committee of September of 1930, 
which ousted Li Li-san from his position as general secretary of the 
Party, also ordered the replacement of the General Front Committee 
17 It was established on February 7, I930. "Chianghsi ti chungyang Su-ch'fi" [The 
Central Soviet Area in Kiangsi], Hung-ch'i choupao, xxiv (November 27, I931), as 
quoted in Hsiao, I, I70. 
18 Hsiao, I, 98. The A-B League apparently was an underground organization of the 
Kuomintang in the Communist areas. It was not directed against the Communists who 
had returned from the Soviet Union and who are referred to in this study as the 
Bolsheviks. Rather, the A-B League was aimed against all Communists. 
" See ibid., I, 98-II3 and II, 259-83 for the text of and commentary on several docu- 
ments concerning the Fut'ien Rebellion. 
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by a Central Bureau for the Soviet Areas (Su-ch'fi chungyang chfi). 
Its nine members were: Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Hsiang Ying, Jen Pi- 
shih, Mao Tse-tung, Yii Fei, Tseng Shang, and two others. Although 
it appears at first sight that the leadership of this new organization 
was diluted compared to the one position, held by Mao, in the General 
Front Committee, his relative power was probably not greatly weak- 
ened by the reorganization. Hsiang Ying reportedly was a man with 
few organizational abilities. Moreover, he, Chou, Yii, and Jen might 
have been not even present in the Kiangsi Soviet Area but in 
Shanghai.20 Thus, perhaps only Tseng Shan, Chu Te, and the two 
unidentified men actually shared power with Mao in Kiangsi. Indirect 
evidence of Mao's continued predominance in Kiangsi, if not in the 
Party as a whole, comes from an order issued on the day after the 
Central Bureau was established, which expelled from the Party the lead- 
ers of the Fut'ien rebellion.2' By the beginning of 1931, therefore, Mao 
Tse-tung had attained positions in the Party, the government, and the 
military in the Central Soviet Area that, while not unchallengeable, 
were among the highest. 
But he had yet to face his greatest challenge. Just as he was strength- 
ening his influence in Kiangsi, the Bolsheviks had been consolidating 
their influence in the Central Committee in Shanghai. Now they were 
ready to turn their attention to the Central Soviet Area in Kiangsi. Be- 
cause of increasing pressure by Chiang Kai-shek's central government 
on their activities in Shanghai, the Bolsheviks decided to transfer the 
Political Bureau to Kiangsi. Dominating the Central Committee and 
having the support of the Comintern, they appeared to have the ability 
to seize the reins of leadership in Kiangsi. 
In September of I93i, either shortly before or shortly after the 
Political Bureau transferred from Shanghai to Kiangsi, the Party 
Center issued a lengthy "directive letter." Apparently dictated by Ch'in 
Pang-hsien, who had assumed the general secretaryship of the Party 
when Hsiang Chung-fa was executed by the central government in 
June of I93I, the letter seemed to attack the leadership of the Kiangsi 
Soviet area by listing several "grievous errors" allegedly committed by 
Mao and other leaders in Kiangsi.22 
The letter also ordered the establishment of a so-called Chinese 
20 ibid., i, I50. 
21 See ibid., I, io8, and II, 269-73 for "Chungyang chi! t'ungkao ti-er-hao: tui Fut'ien 
shihpien ti chiiehi" [Central Bureau Circular Note No. 2: Resolution on the Fut'ien 
incident]. 
22 "Chungyang tui Su-ch'5i chihshih hsin" [Directive letter of the Party Central to 
the Soviet areas], in Hsiao, I, i59-62, and II, 382-89. 
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Soviet Government (Chunghua suweiai chengfu) during a congress 
scheduled for November of 1931.23 This congress, the First All-China 
Soviet Congress, opened at Juichin on November 7, 193i. Toward its 
close in December, the congress elected sixty-three p rsons to the Cen- 
tral Executive Committee. Mao became its chairman, and Hsiang Ying 
and Chang Kuo-t'ao its vice-chairmen. Directly under the Central Ex- 
ecutive Committee was a Council of People's Commissars (jenmin 
weiyfianhui), also headed by Mao, charged with the day-to-day ad- 
ministration of the Central Soviet Area, i.e., the main base area in 
Kiangsi.24 
Mao's appointment o the chairmanship of the Central Executive 
Committee and to its Council of People's Commissars marked the high 
point of his influence during the Kiangsi period. He now held leading 
positions in all three hierarchies. He was the head of the government, 
he was the general political commissar of the armed forces, and he was 
a member of the Party's Central Committee. Very shortly thereafter, 
however, the recently arrived Bolsheviks began systematically to cur- 
tail his influence, directing first attack against his military position. 
With the onset in December of 1930 of the first concerted attempts by 
the central government to dislodge the Communists from their bases in 
Kiangsi, the Communist leaders' military posts grew more important 
than their government and even their Party posts. 
In 1932, during the fifteen-month pause between the third and fourth 
encirclement campaigns against the Central Soviet Area, a dispute 
broke out between Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-Lai over the proper 
defensive strategy. Mao favored mobile guerrilla warfare by which he 
would lure the enemy deep into the Communist territory, where 
numerically vastly superior Communist roops could isolate and attack 
small contingents of government roops. This strategy had been used 
against the first hree encirclement campaigns, but Chou En-lai, speak- 
ing as a secretary of the Bolshevik-dominated Political Bureau, had 
ordered it discontinued, possibly because of the growing disaffection 
among the civilian population in the Central Soviet Area. Mobile 
guerrilla warfare exposed the civilians not only to destruction of 
property but also to retaliation by government roops, and their sense 
23 Ibid. 
24 Hsiao, I, I73. There were nine commissariats, as follows: 
Foreign Affairs: Wang Chia-hsiang Military: Chu Te 
Labor: Hsiang Ying Finance: Teng Tse-hui 
Land: Chang T'ing-ch'eng Education: Ch'M Ch'iu-pai 
Internal Affairs: Chou I-li Judicial: Chang Kuo-t'ao 
Worker-Peasant Investigation: Ho Shu-heng. See Wang, II, 286. 
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of insecurity, as well as dissatisfaction with other Communist policies, 
resulted in diminished cooperation and increased ifficulty in recruit- 
ing. Possibly to restore the civilians' morale, Chou En-lai advocated 
positional warfare ("to keep the enemy beyond the gates") and a strat- 
egy of carrying the fight into enemy territory. In his view, guerrilla 
warfare still had its usefulness but it was to be waged only behind 
enemy lines. 
The clash between these two strategies was brought o a head in 
August of 1932 when the Party Central called the Ningtu Conference, 
which was an enlarged meeting of the Central Bureau for the Soviet 
Areas. Chou En-lai's strategy, which the Bolsheviks advocated, won 
out, and Mao was removed from the Military Affairs Committee. After 
the conference, his influence began to wane rapidly. Both Hsiao and 
Ch'en cite sources aying that Mao became inactive due to actual or 
political illness and that Chou En-lai became the de facto political 
leader in the armed forces.25 Chou's new position was confirmed on 
May 8, 1933, when he was formally appointed to Mao's two posts as 
general political commissar of all armed forces and as political com- 
missar of the First Front Army.26 Mao's guerrilla strategy and, by im- 
plication, Mao himself, were further attacked in February of 1933 
when Lo Ming, the acting secretary ofthe Party's Provincial Commit- 
tee in Fukien, was severely criticized by Ch'in Pang-hsien, the Party's 
new general secretary, for applying Mao's strategy. Closer to home, 
Mao was indirectly attacked when the campaign against he so-called 
Lo Ming line was waged against his brother, Mao Tse-t'an and Teng 
Hsiao-p'ing, the secretary of the Party's Kiangsi committee.27 
When the central government's Nineteenth Route Army, under 
Ch'en Ming-shu, prepared to rebel in Fukien, the Communists in 
25 Ch'ihfei fantung wenchien huipien [Collection of Communist Reactionary Docu- 
ments], II, 449-50, in Hsiao, I, 2IO-II; and Ku Kuan-chiao, Sanshih-nien lai ti Chung- 
kung [Thirty Years of the Chinese Communists], 76, in Jerome Ch'en, Mao and the 
Chinese Revolution (New York i967), I76. Ch'en also cites pages 220-2I in Hsiao, but 
this is incorrect. He may have meant pages 210-I I, in which case it would have been more 
helpful to cite, as Hsiao does, the original source. It should be noted, however, that 
during the fifth encirclement campaign in I934, the leadership had second thoughts 
about the strategy of positional warfare, but it was too late for any change because the 
initiative had already shifted to the central government troops. 
26 Hsiao, I, 220; Hatano Ken'ichi, Chfigoku Ay6sant6 shi [History of the Chinese 
Communist Party] (Tokyo i96i), IV, 27i and chart at end of volume. 
27 "Mao Tse-t'an t'ungchih ti San-kuo chihje" [Comrade Mao Tse-t'an's enthusiasm 
for the Romance of Three Kingdoms], Hung-se Chunghua, xcii (July 8, I933) and 
Ch'en Shou-ch'ang, "Wei chiach'iang tang tui koming chancheng ti lingtao erh 
toucheng" [Fight for strengthening the Party's leadership in the revolutionary war], 
Toucheng, xvi (July I5, I933), cited by Kuo in FCYP, April I967, 98-99, and IS, July 
I967, 48-49. 
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Kiangsi concluded an agreement with Ch'en on October 26, 1933. On 
December 5, however, the Party's Central Committee, under the dom- 
ination of the Bolsheviks, denounced the rebels in Fukien.28 Although 
Mao Tse-tung and Chu Te allegedly wanted to maintain relations with 
the rebels, Mao's influence in the Party had already reached such a 
low level that his pleas went unheeded.29 
Mao Tse-tung's influence also waned in the Party after the Ningtu 
Conference. Until November of 1927 an alternate member of the 
Political Bureau, and later appointed as secretary of the General Front 
Committee, Mao was unable to find a place on the nine-man Secretariat 
that was elected at the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee at 
Juichin in January of 1934. The Bolsheviks continued to dominate the 
Secretariat, whose members were Chang Wen-t'ien, Ch'en Shao-yii, 
Ch'in Pang-hsien, Chou En-lai, Hsiang Ying, Liang Pai-t'ai, Liu Shao- 
ch'i, Wang Chia-hsiang, and Wu Liang-p'ing. Ch'in Pang-hsien re- 
mained the general secretary of the Party.30 
Even more important, Mao was excluded from the Political Bureau 
and hence from the leadership of the Party as defined in this study. 
The Political Bureau, as elected at the Fifth Plenum, is reported to 
have consisted of these fourteen members and alternate members: 
Chang Kuo-t'ao, Chang Wen-t'ien, Ch'en Shao-yii, Ch'en Yiun, Ch'in 
Pang-hsien, Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Ho K'o-ch'iian, Hsiang Ying, Jen 
Pi-shih, K'ang Sheng, Ku Tso-lin, Kuan Hsiang-ying, and Wang Chia- 
hsiang.3' 
28 "Chungkuo kungch'antang chungyang weiyiianhui wei Fuchien shihpien kao 
ch'iian-kuo minchung" [Statement of the Central Committee of the Chinese Com- 
munist Party to the people of the entire country on the Fukien incident], cited in 
Hsiao, I, 249 and II, 676. A photocopy of the eleven-point agreement, entitled "Fan-Jih 
fan-Chiang ti ch'upu hsiehting" [Preliminary Agreement Against Japan and Chiang] 
is in Hsiao, II, 676. In a recent article, Jerome Ch'en erroneously lists November 26 as 
the date of the agreement. See Jerome Ch'en, "Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference," 
The China Quarterly, XL (October-December i969), 28. I received this article two days 
before submitting my manuscript for publication and, therefore, did not have sufficient 
time to comment more fully on Ch'en's article. A few remarks here and in other foot- 
notes must suffice. 
29 Many years later, Mao blamed the Bolsheviks for breaking off relations with the 
rebels in Fukien. He explicitly blamed the action for the collapse of the Central Soviet 
Area in an interview with Edgar Snow in I936. See Edgar Snow, Red Star Over 
China (New York I938), i86. He implied the same in "Kuanyfi jokan lishih went'i 
ti chiiehi" [Resolution on some historical problems] in Mao Tse-tung hsianchi (Peking 
i964), III, 955-Io02, and in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Peking i965), III, I77-225. 
30Wang, II, 520. Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank (p. 38), and Robert North (p. i64) 
quoting Chang Kuo-t'ao, say that Chang Wen-t'ien replaced Ch'in Pang-hsien at this 
plenum. See Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese 
Communism (Cambridge, Mass. I952) and Robert C. North, Moscow and Chinese 
Communists (Stanford, 2nd ed. i963). The evidence available to me convinces me 
that this did not occur until the Tsunyi Conference a year later. 
31 Kuo, in FCYP, July i967, io6, and IS, October i967, 38. The Standing Committee 
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Mao lost influence even in the government, the least important of 
the three hierarchies. On February 3, 1934, during the Second All- 
China Soviet Congress, held in Juichin, he was re-elected as chairman 
of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic, 
but he was replaced by Chang Wen-t'ien, a Bolshevik, as chairman of 
the Council of People's Commissars.32 Moreover, when Mao had been 
elected as chairman of the Central Executive Committee at the First 
All-China Soviet Congress, he had had to share his governmental 
powers only with his two vice-chairmen, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Hsiang 
Ying. Now, in addition to the same two men, fourteen other men, 
composing a so-called Presidium (chuhsi-t'uan), were elected as "the 
supreme organ of political power."33 
During the fateful months of summer and early fall of 1934, when 
the central government's fifth encirclement campaign inexorably 
tightened the noose around the Central Soviet Area, Mao Tse-tung 
appeared to be removed from positions where the decision had to be 
made to try to escape the closing trap. According to Kung Ch'u, the 
chief of staff of the Central Military District, and Chang Kuo-t'ao, in 
consequence of Mao's alleged opposition to the Party's denunciation 
of the rebellion in Fukien, he was put on probation as a Party member 
by an order from Moscow. Kung says that Mao was denied access to 
all Party meetings and that he did not take part in the decision on 
October 2 to abandon the Central Soviet Area and to begin what became 
known as the Long March. Chang believes that Mao had been de- 
prived of virtually all authority on the eve of the Long March.34 
We do not have conclusive proof that Kung's and Chang's assertions 
are correct, but there is indirect evidence that they might be. It is 
known that for some time during that summer, Mao was not even in 
Juichin, where all important organizations were located and where 
all top decisions were made. Ch'uan Lien-chang says in his article 
"Mao chuhsi tsai Yiitu" [Chairman Mao in Yiitu] that Mao suffered 
from malaria nd spent some time in September inYiitu, a town some 
fifty miles west of Juichin.35 Another Communist source says that 
Mao was in Yiitu during the summer of 1934, that he left for Kaopinao 
of the Political Bureau consisted of Chang Wen-t'ien, Ch'en Yiin, ch'in Pang-hsien, 
Chou En-lai, and Hsiang Ying. Kuo, ibid. 
32 "Chung-hua suweiai kunghokuo chungyang chihhsing weiyuianhui pukao, ti-i-hao" 
[Proclamation of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic, 
No. I], cited in Hsiao, I, 280-8I and II, 762. 
33Hung-se Chunghua, No. I48 (February I2, I934), cited by Kuo in FCYP, July 
I967, II4 and IS, October I967, 52. 
34 Hsiao, I, 296-97. 
35Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao [The Red Flag Flutters] (Peking I959), x, 3. 
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near Juichin, "where he was very busy, calling meetings of the respon- 
sible cadres in the localities he visited or making investigations i  the 
villages," that he returned to Yfitu at the end of September, and that 
he then departed from there on the Long March on October io."3 
A different version was told to Nym Wales in I937 by Hsii Meng- 
ch'iu, who said that Mao went briefly, presumably in late September, 
to Juichin, where he participated inthe decision to evacuate the Central 
Soviet Area. According to Hsi!, the decision was reached by some 
military council composed of Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Liu Po-ch'eng, 
Mao Tse-tung, Wang Chia-hsiang, and the Comintern military adviser 
Li Te.37 This council, probably constituted a hoc, was not the same 
as the Party's Revolutionary Military Committee, sometimes translated 
as Council. 
In the light of the failure of two publications that unreservedly 
praise Mao to mention his alleged role in the decision of October 2, 
I934, I find Hsi's assertion unconvincing.3 At any rate, even if we 
assume that Mao had attended that meeting, his influence within the 
leadership would have been small. Had Mao actually been permitted 
to attend the meeting, itwould have been solely by virtue of his titular 
chairmanship ofthe Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet 
Republic. On the eve of the Long March, all decisive political military 
positions were occupied by other leaders. They were: 
Chairman of the Party's Military Affairs 
Committee: Chou En-lai 
Director of the National Political Protection 
Office: Teng Fa 
First Front Army: 
Commander Chu Te 
Political Commissar Chou En-lai 
Chief of Staff Liu Po-ch'eng (formerly 
Yeh Chien-ying) 
Director of Political Department Wang Chia-hsiang 
Central Military District: 
Commander Hsiang Ying 
36 Ch'en Chang-feng, On The Long March With Chairman Mao (Peking i959), i9. 
37Nym Wales, Red Dust: Autobiographies of Chinese Communists (Stanford i952), 
67. 
38 Hsfi Meng-ch'iu was one of the Bolsheviks who by I937 had lost much of their 
former influence. By telling an unsuspecting interviewer that Mao took part in the 
decision, he may have been trying to ingratiate himself with Mao. 
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Political Commissar Hsiang Ying 
Chief of Staff Kung Ch'u 
Director of Political Department Ch'en I 
Director of Branch Office of the National 
Political Protection Office T'an Chen-lin39 
In sum, Mao was not a member of the political leadership, which 
was in the hands of the Bolsheviks, nor of the military leadership. 
Moreover, although he nominally retained the chairmanship of the 
Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic, that 
post actually ceased to exist when the Communists abandoned the 
Central Soviet Area. As far as we know, no change in the political 
and military leadership took place until the Tsunyi Conference in 
January of I935. 
THE LONG MARCHES 
After the First Front Army occupied Tsunyi on January 5, I935, 
the Central Committee convened an enlarged conference of the Polit- 
ical Bureau on January 6 through 8. The standard post-i949 Commu- 
nist interpretation fthe Tsunyi Conference, as expressed by Ho Kan- 
chih, has been that "the 'Left' opportunists were removed from their 
leading positions and a new Party leadership headed by Comrade Mao 
Tse-tung was established." Like many China specialists, the Commu- 
nists see the Tsunyi Conference as the turning point in the history of 
the Communist Party, or, as Ho put it, "the beginning of a new lead- 
ership in the Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung 
was a change of paramount historical importance in the Party."4 
The known facts do not support such a sweeping assertion. Two 
cardinal points must be considered: the participants and the decisions 
of the conference. Perhaps twenty leaders participated, of whom seven- 
teen have been identified by Kuo Hua-lun. They are said to be Chang 
Wen-t'ien (Lo Fu), Ch'en Yfin, general secretary Ch'in Pang-hsien 
(Po Ku), Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Ho K'o-ch'iian (K'ai Feng) Li Fu- 
ch'un, Li Wei-han (Lo Mai), Lin Piao, Liu Po-ch'eng, Liu Shao-ch'i, 
Mao Tse-tung, Nieh Jung-chen, P'eng Te-huai, Teng Fa, Wang Shou- 
tao, and Yang Shang-k'un.4' Although this is the most extensive avail- 
39 Wang, II, 622; Hsiieh Yiieh, Chiao-fei chishih [Record of Encircling the Commu- 
nists] (Taipei i962), table between pages I4 and I5; Kung Ch'u, Wo yii Hung-ehiin 
[The Red Army and I] (Hong Kong I954), 405-6. 
40 Ho Kan-chih, A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution (Peking I959), 265. 
41 Kuo, in FCYP, September i967, 99, and in IS, January i968, 44. Also present at 
the conference was the Comintern adviser Li Te (Otto Braun, alias Albert and Wagner) 
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able list of the participants at the Tsunyi Conference, it is admittedly 
not complete, and possibly not free from error. A second difficulty is 
created by the absence of any complete roster of members of the Polit- 
ical Bureau.42 To the best of my knowledge, there were about thirteen 
members. 
Of those whom Kuo identified asparticipants at Tsunyi, seven were 
probably Political Bureau members: Chang Wen-t'ien, Ch'en Yiin, 
Ch'in Pang-hsien, Chou En-lai, Li Wei-han, Liu Shao-ch'i, and Li 
Fu-ch'un.43 Nine of the other ten identified men were important leaders 
in the Party and the military, and the only participant who held no 
leading posts in the Party or the military was Mao Tse-tung." It may 
be speculated, therefore, that his inclusion in the deliberations at
Tsunyi was based on his by then purely nominal chairmanship ofthe 
defunct Chinese Soviet Republic and, possibly, on an invitation by one 
or more Political Bureau members. 
What is of equal significance, however, isthat fourteen other leaders, 
equal in importance tothose cited above and including five probable 
members of the Political Bureau, did not participate inthat conference, 
whose purpose was to discuss trategy and other military subjects.45 
There is no evidence to suggest hat the general political ine was 
placed on the agenda. Ch'in Pang-hsien presided over the conference, 
and Wu Hsiu-ch'iian, his interpreter. See "Irrefutable evidence of crime of Wu Hsiu- 
ch'iian's betrayal of the Party and the country," Hung-wei Chan-pao, April I3, i967; 
translated in U.S. Consulate-General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 
4007 (August 23, i967), 4. 
42 Although Hatano lists eleven members in one of his charts, I am inclined to 
think that membership in the Political Bureau at that time is not precisely known. See 
Hatano, v, chart at end of volume. 
43 Kuo may be in error when he lists the last three men as either members or alter- 
nate members of the Central Committee. Kuo, ibid. Ch'en, in "Resolutions of the Tsunyi 
Conference," i9, says that "Liu Shao-ch'i by all accounts did not take part in the Long 
March." (Italics added.) I can think offhand of one source that states that Liu did take 
part: Chingkangshan Fighting Corps of the Fourth Hospital, Peking, "A Chronicle of 
Events in the Life of Liu Shao-ch'i" (May i967), translated in U.S. Consulate-General, 
Hong Kong, Current Background, No. 834 (August i7, i967), 3. In the absence of 
incontrovertible vidence, we must assume that this source is as reliable or unreliable 
as other sources. The crux of my argument rests with the highly unstable situation at 
Tsunyi. Leaders came and went throughout their stay in the Tsunyi area; hence it is 
probable that different lists of participants may all be partly right, depending on 
when the various eyewitnesses were at or near the conference site. 
44They were: Chu Te, Liu Po-ch'eng, Ho K'o-ch'iian, P'eng Te-huai, Yank Shang- 
k'un, Lin Piao, Nieh Jung-chen, Wang Shou-t'ao, Li Wei-han, and Teng Fa. 
45 The Political Bureau members were Ch'en Shao-yii (Wang Ming), Chang Kuo-t'ao, 
jen Pi-shih, Hsiang Ying, and Wang Chia-hsiang. Three important leaders who were 
with the First Front Army but are not known to have attended the conference were 
Yeh Chien-ying, Tung Chen-t'ang, and Lo P'ing-hui; and six who unquestionably did 
not participate were Ho Lung, Hsii Hsiang-ch'ien, Hsiao K'o, Wang Chen, Ch'en I, 
and Kung Ch'u. 
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and Chou En-lai, P'eng Te-huai, Mao Tse-tung, and Liu Shao-ch'i 
and perhaps other leaders presented reports. Chou, in his capacity as 
chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, read the military report 
and three other speakers criticized various aspects of past military 
strategy. P'eng, commander of the Third Army Corps, denounced 
wholesale evacuation, desertion, and slow movement, which he blamed 
for the heavy casualties uffered by the Communists ince their exodus 
from the Central Soviet Area in October of I934. Mao criticized the 
defensive strategy during the fifth encirclement campaign against the 
Central Soviet Area. Liu, the director of the Party's trade union depart- 
ment, complained about "Left adventurism," which he said emerged 
after the fourth plenum of the Political Bureau in January of I93I 
and caused the virtual disintegration of Party organizations in the 
"White" areas, i.e., anywhere xcept in the few Communist base areas.46 
It is important o note that Liu Shao-ch'i did not support Mao's argu- 
ment but rather seemed to speak his mind as an individual eader about 
what he considered had been serious errors in the Party's policies. 
In the ensuing debate, the Party's political line apparently also came 
under attack. It was, however, ably defended by general secretary 
Ch'in Pang-hsien and its resolutions were reaffirmed by the conference. 
There is insufficient evidence for a well-defined and cohesive faction 
commanded by Mao, and it is therefore misleading to speak, as Pro- 
fessor Rue does, of a Maoist group. Individual leaders seemed to be 
attempting to induce their co-equal comrades to support them in the 
formal vote at the end of the conference. They did not succeed, as is 
evidenced by the compromise offered by Chang Wen-t'ien. He sup- 
ported general secretary Ch'in by approving of the Party's general 
political line, but he blamed him, Chou En-lai, and Li Te for the 
defensive strategy during the fifth encirclement campaign and thus 
implicitly agreed with the criticisms raised by P'eng and Mao. 
Chang Wen-t'ien's middle position won out. The conference adopted 
a document entitled "Chungyang chengchih chii k'uangta huiyi 
chiiehyi: chient'ao Po Ku, Chou En-lai, Li Te t'ungchih chiinshih 
luhsien ti ts'owu" ["Resolutions of the Enlarged Conference of the 
Central Political Bureau: A review of the errors in the military line 
of Comrades Po Ku, Chou En-lai, and Li Te"]. I summarize the major 
resolutions, as recollected by one of the conferees.47 
48 Wei K'o-wei (Carl Wei), "Tsunyi huiyi lishih chenhsiang (hsia)," [The truth 
about the Tsunyi Conference (Part II)], in FCYP, November i968, II3, and IS, Feb- 
ruary i969, 24. 
47 Kuo. in FCYP, September i967, ioo-oi, and IS, January 1968, 45-47. Kuo's inform- 
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The danger of China's becoming a Japanese colony was increasing 
because the Kuomintang prevented the Communists from moving 
northward to fight the Japanese. Proof of this was the fifth encircle- 
ment campaign against the Communists and their ouster from the Cen- 
tral Soviet Area. Since the Fourth Plenum of the Political Bureau in Jan- 
uary of I93I, the Party had, with Comintern help, steered a correct 
path and had avoided factional splits within its ranks. On the other 
hand, the military line during the fifth encirclement campaign con- 
tained serious errors. The principle of not yielding territory placed the 
Communist troops in a conservative and passive attitude. This atti- 
tude expressed itself in unwillingness to abandon certain Soviet pockets, 
to lure the central government roops deep into Soviet territories, and 
to launch counterattacks into territories held by the central govern- 
ment. The Communists uffered heavy casualties because of this erro- 
neous military strategy. During the evacuation of the Central Soviet 
Area, political mobilization was given up under the pretext of pre- 
serving military secrets and this lowered the morale of the troops. More- 
over, the transport of heavy equipment, printing presses, and the like, 
slowed down the troops and led to further heavy losses at the hands 
of the pursuing central government roops. After reviewing and cor- 
recting the erroneous military line of "simple defense and desertion- 
ism," the Party should be able to display its fine tradition in mobile 
warfare in order to fight for achieving tasks currently confronting it. 
The conference decided to continue the northward march across the 
Yangtze River for the purpose of joining with the Fourth Front Army 
commanded by Chang Kuo-t'ao. Divisions were abolished, and officers 
were sent down to regiments and companies to strengthen their combat 
efficiency. 
The conference also decided to reorganize the Party's Central Com- 
mittee and Military Affairs Committee. Chang Wen-t'ien, who had 
induced the conferees to adopt his compromise resolutions, emerged 
as the leader of the Party by replacing Ch'in Pang-hsien as the general 
secretary. Ch'in was appointed as director of the General Political De- 
partment of the Red Army, with Li Wei-han (Lo Mai) as director of 
its organization section and Ho K'o-ch'iian as director of its propaganda 
section. Ch'en Yfin, the director of the White Areas work committee who 
had defended Li Te, was ordered to go to Moscow to inform the Com- 
ant, Ch'en Jan, was the director of the central personnel corps for local work in 
P'eng Te-huai's Third Corps during the Tsunyi Conference. He went under the 
pseudonym of Kuo Chien. 
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intern of the Tsunyi Conference and to obtain its approval of the reso- 
lutions. His place was taken by P'an Han-nien, who was instructed to 
establish liaison centers in Hong Kong and Shanghai. 
Most important for this study's objective, Mao Tse-tung replaced 
Chou En-lai as chairman of the Party's Military Affairs Committee. 
Mao also became a member of the Political Bureau and of its Stand- 
ing Committee, where he replaced Hsiang Ying, who had been left 
behind in the abandoned Central Soviet Area.48 These two appointments 
were major gains for Mao, but they were the only gains that we can 
safely say he had actually won at Tsunyi. The information is based 
on recollections by Ch'en Jan, one of the participants of the conference 
and, in my judgment, is more reliable than the interpretations given 
by many China specialists because, as shown below, they are based 
either on no sources at all or on exceedingly vague sources. It is possi- 
ble, of course, that Ch'en's recollections are faulty or that the informa- 
tion given by him and presented by Kuo Hua-lun is wrong in any 
number of respects. But only total fabrication, which in my opinion is 
improbable, would make Ch'en's information less useful and reliable 
than the sources relied upon by some China specialists. 
A few representative samples of interpretations ofthe Tsunyi Con- 
ference must suffice. John Rue and Stuart Schram assert, without offer- 
ing any evidence, that Mao became the chairman of the Political Bu- 
reau. Schram adds that this post was newly created at the Tsunyi 
Conference.49 Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank go still farther and say 
that "Mao formally assumes Party leadership as Chairman of [Central 
Committee] and Politburo."50 Like Rue and Schram, they offer no 
evidence to back up their interpretation. Hsiao, Lewis, and Swarup 
make only some vague and uncorroborated remarks, such as "Mao 
got the upper hand of Ch'in [Pang-hsien] and achieved control of the 
Party" (Hsiao), "Mao became party leader" (Lewis), and "the deci- 
sion of the Tsunyi Conference [elevated] Mao to top leadership" 
(Swarup).5' As noted earlier, John Lindbeck says that Mao became 
the "undisputed leader" and Samuel Griffith says that he attained an 
"unchallengeable position."52 Griffith also demonstrates conclusively 
that the image of a quasi-collective l adership is not weakened by the 
absence of supporting evidence, for he remarks in the very next sen- 
48Kuo, in FCYP, September i967, ioi, and IS, January i968, 47-48. 
49 Rue, 270; Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung (Baltimore i966), i82. 
50 Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, 38. 
51 Hsiao, I59; Shanti Swarup, A Study of the Chinese Communist Movement, 
I927-1934 (Oxford i966), 257; Lewis, 22. 
52Treadgold, 78; Griffith, 51. 
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tence that "to this day, no one outside the tight circle at the top of the 
Party knows precisely what went on behind closed doors at Tsunyi."53 
The only China specialist who makes an effort to back up his state- 
ment hat Mao became the chairman of the Political Bureau is Jerome 
Ch'en,54 who cites five sources for supporting evidence. Unfortunately, 
one of his sources is not available to me at present, but the other four 
do not support his assertion. One is Mrs. Helen Foster Snow, who re- 
marks en passant that "Mao achieved power."55 A second source Ch'en 
relies heavily on in his work is Ku Kuan-chiao's polemic against he 
Chinese Communists, inwhich Ku remarks that Mao made Chang 
Wen-t'ien his "puppet" (k'uei lei).56 These two sources require no 
further consideration. A third, Ho Kan-chih, merely says that the con- 
ference "established Comrade Mao Tse-tung's position as leader of 
the whole Party."57 The fourth source, Liu Po-ch'eng, declares that "this 
conference . . . began a new leadership with Comrade Mao Tse-tung 
as the head of the [Party] Central."58 As in the case of the decision to 
evacuate the Central Soviet Area, the available sources lend no credi- 
bility to the opinion, presented as a statement of fact, that Mao Tse- 
tung became the chairman of the Political Bureau. Ho Kan-chih's 
book and Liu Po-ch'eng's reminiscences fully reflect the intense xalta- 
tion of Mao that characterized the period during which they were 
published. They could therefore b  expected to mention Mao's pro- 
motion to the chairmanship ofthe Political Bureau, had he indeed 
been promoted at Tsunyi. But they do not; instead they indulge in 
what appears to be deliberately vague language such as "leader of the 
whole Party" and "head of the Central," neither of which terms, need- 
less to say, refers to an actual position in the Party. 
In sum, two men clearly gained strength during the Tsunyi Confer- 
ence: Chang Wen-t'ien and Mao Tse-tung. Both men had their views 
adopted by their peers and both men were promoted in their Party 
positions. For Chang, it was to the highest post in the Party; for Mao, 
53Griffith, 5I. 
54 Ch'en, i89. 
5 Nym Wales, I4. 
56 Ku Kuan-chiao, San-shih nien lai ti Chungkung [Thirty Years of the Chinese 
Communists] (Hong Kong I955), 77-78. In his "Resolutions of the Tsunyi Confer- 
ence," 20, Ch'en repudiates Ku's remark but does not mention his earlier heavy reliance 
on Ku. But if Ch'en drops Ku as supporting evidence, he is not inclined to reconsider 
his basic claim, for on p. 36 he refers matter-of-factly to "the election of Mao to the 
chairmanship of the Politburo" at Tsunyi. 
57 Ho Kan-chih, A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution (Peking i960), 265. 
Ch'en incorrectly cites pages 260-70. 
58 Liu Po-ch'eng, "Huiku ch'ang-cheng" [Reminiscing about the Long March], Hsing- 
huo liao-yfian [A Single Spark Starts a Prairie Fire] (Peking i960), 5. 
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a return to the Political Bureau from which he had been removed in 
I927. Of the two positions to which Mao was elected, the chairman- 
ship of the Military Affairs Committee was probably the more impor- 
tant for the duration of the Long March. It gave him a vantage point 
from which he could decisively influence the strategic and tactical de- 
cisions of at least one body of Communist roops, the First Front Army. 
In the broadest sense, the principal outcome of the Tsunyi Confer- 
ence does not seem to have been the personal victory of Mao over his 
rivals. Rather, the chief significance of that conference was the ascend- 
ancy of a military frame of mind within the Party leadership. The 
great hardships of the Long March demanded of the Chinese Com- 
munists a degree of attention to military matters to which the old 
leadership, ensconced in the cities of China until 193i, had never been 
obligated. Mao had always had a penchant for military matters. The man 
whose lifelong motto has been "Power grows out of the barrel of a 
gun" was in many respects the most appropriate agent for the victory 
of the military frame of mind at Tsunyi. This view does not imply, 
of course, that Mao was somehow the passive tool of impersonal his- 
torical forces: he had, after all, made patient and persistent prepara- 
tions for his comeback to the higher levels of Party leadership. This 
view, however, does stress the conjunction at the time of the Tsunyi 
Conference of Mao's own efforts and of the environmental forces that 
impinged upon a party fighting for survival. 
If the military exigencies of the Long March enabled Mao Tse-tung 
to rise once again to the higher levels of the Party leadership, they also 
placed sharp limitations on his ability to attain an undisputed and un- 
challengeable position in the entire Party. Latter-day statements to this 
effect seem to overlook Chang Wen-t'ien, the new general secretary 
of the Party, who was with the First Front Army. Even if Mao had 
been able, thanks to his position of chairman of the Military Affairs 
Committee and to the military nature of the Long March, to assert 
his authority on military matters, Chang's influence in political matters 
was not likely to have vanished overnight.59 
Moreover, Mao could not have acquired supreme political power 
over the entire Party for the basic reason that many wielders of politico- 
military power in the Party were not with the First Front Army but 
elsewhere. The Central Soviet Area, which the central government 
59In their efforts to discount Chang Wen-t'ien's importance, some China specialists 
resort to imprecise language. Stuart Schram, for example, says that although Chang 
became the new general secretary of the Party, "henceforth the real power belonged to 
Mao." Schram, i82. (Italics added). 
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had forced the First Front Army under Chu, Mao, Chou, and others 
to abandon, was one of about fifteen Communist base areas. Two of 
them, the Western Hunan-Hupei (Hsiang-O-Hsi) and Hupei-Honan- 
Anhui (O-Yii-Wan), were especially important. Their large military 
forces were second only to those in the Central Soviet Area. 
The Western Hunan-Hupei base area was controlled by the Second 
Front Army under the command of Ho Lung. It started its own Long 
March on November i9, 1935, more than a year later than the First 
Front Army, which it never met until most Communist troops con- 
centrated in Northern Shensi in early 1937. Composed of five divisions, 
the Second Front Army consisted of some 20,000 troops in November 
of 1935. After much hard fighting, the Second Front Army met with 
the Fourth Front Army near Kantze in Sikang in June of 1936.60 
The Fourth Front Army, under Chang Kuo-t'ao, was extremely im- 
portant both for its much larger size and for its leader's opposition to 
Mao Tse-tung. Originally stationed in the Hupei-Honan-Anhui base 
area, where its troop strength was said to be around 20,000,61 it started 
out on its Long March in December of 1932 and moved to the border 
between Szechuan and Shensi, where it rested and greatly enlarged 
its troop strength. By early spring of 1934, Chang Kuo-t'ao's Fourth 
Front Army had firm control over a sufficiently arge area, with an 
estimated population of nine million, to establish a "Szechuan-Shensi 
Soviet Area" with Chang Kuo-t'ao as Chairman. He also presided over 
a newly created Northwest Revolutionary Military Committee (Hsipei 
homing chfinshih weiyfianhui). In order to facilitate the First Front 
Army's northward march from Tsunyi, the Fourth Front Army left its 
Szechuan-Shensi base in March of 1935 and moved westward. It is 
said to have had about 8o,ooo troops at that time.62 
Reduced to about 70,000 troops as a result of heavy fighting but 
again fully rested and well-armed, the Fourth Front Army met the 
First Front Army at Moukung in Northern Szechuan on June i6, 
935.63 The First Front Army had lost much of its strength, its original 
60 Chungkuo kung-nung hung-chfin ti-i fangmien chln ch'ang-cheng chi [A Record 
of the Long March of the First Front Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red 
Army] (Peking I958), 464-65 (hereafter cited as Chungkuo kung-nung). Ch'en's un- 
substantiated claim that the two armies met in May is probably incorrect (p. 386). 
61 "Ch'uan-Shen Su-ch'fi yii hung-ssu fangmien chuin ti chingjen shengli" [The 
Szechuan-Shensi Soviet area and the Red Fourth Front Army's smashing victories], 
Toucheng, LXIV (February 2I, I934), cited by Kuo in FCYP, November i967, io8, and 
in IS, March i968, 38. 
62 Chungkuo tung-nung, 46i. 
63Ibid., 435. Ch'en, quoting Agnes Smedley and Edgar Snow, says that the Fourth 
Front Army had only 50,000 troops at the time of juncture (Ch'en, I93). 
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go,ooo troops having been reduced to about 35,ooo exhausted, starved, 
ill-clad, and poorly armed troops. 
The leaders of the two front armies convened a Political Bureau con- 
ference at nearby Lianghok'ou on June 25. Mao and others argued for 
joining in a "Long March" northward to Northern Shensi, where 
Hsii Hai-tung and Kao Kang had established a base area, for the 
ostensible purpose of fighting against he Japanese. Chang Kuo-t'ao, 
on the other hand, thought hat this strategy was unrealistic nview 
of the greatly weakened strength of the Communists. He suggested 
instead that he Communists should remain in Sikang and Szechuan and 
later establish contact, for possible aid, with the Soviet Union through 
Sinkiang. Chang may have felt that whatever influence Mao had 
achieved in the First Front Army as a result of the Tsunyi Conference 
must not spread to his own army. After all, Chang had been Mao's 
senior in the Party before the Tsunyi Conference, which he, Chang, 
had not attended; and, most important, his 70,000 troops were superior 
to Mao's in both numerical nd physical strength. Neither Chang nor, 
in all probability, any of the participants except Mao thought that Mao 
was, in Jerome Ch'en's words, "the leader of the party whom Chang 
had to obey."64 
The conference ended in a stalemate and, upon the suggestion of 
Chu Te, who acted as mediator, the two armies decided to rest. They 
moved on to Maoerhkai and rested there from July io through 29.65 
During this time, the Party leadership held another conference tore- 
solve the deadlock reached earlier at Lianghok'ou. 
The conferees atMaoerhkai once again failed to agree on a common 
strategy but they did effect a compromise ofsorts. The two front armies 
were divided so that two columns, east and west, might be formed out 
of elements of both armies. Mao Tse-tung was to command the eastern 
column, composed of his own First and Third Army Corps and of the 
Fourth Front Army's Fourth and Thirtieth Armies. Chang Kuo-t'ao 
was to command the western column composed of his own Thirty-first 
and Thirty-second Armies and of the First Front Army's Fifth and 
Ninth Corps. The two columns were roughly equal in numerical 
strength, but Chang had a clear edge over Mao. First, virtually the en- 
tire Red Army headquarters, including commander in chief Chu Te, 
was attached to his column. Second, soon after Mao's column resumed 
its northern march, one of its units, the Thirtieth Army, under Hsi! 
Hsiang-ch'ien, lost its way and had to return to Maoerhkai where it 
added to the strength of Chang Kuo-t'ao's column. How deep the divi- 
64 Ch'en, I93. 65 Chungkuo kung-nung, 436. 
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sion between Chang and Mao had become was shown by the creation 
by Chang of a rival Central Committee with himself as its head.66 
It is incontrovertible, th refore, that as long as he was on the Long 
March, Mao Tse-tung had not been able to assume the position of 
supreme leadership of the Party that latter-day Chinese and Western 
interpretations give him. It is also true, however, that Chang Kuo-t'ao, 
his most serious rival, was soon to see his military power decimated 
by central government troops. After moving southward from Maoerh- 
kai, his column suffered heavy casualties in its attempt to establish a 
viable base in Sikang. After they joined at Kantze, the Second and 
Fourth Front Armies decided to move northward in the direction of 
Shensi, where Mao's First Front Army had arrived in November of 
1935. But when they met with elements of that army at Huining in 
October of 1936, Chang Kuo-t'ao decided not to proceed to Northern 
Shensi but to move westward in the direction of the Kansu Corridor 
and Sinkiang.67 For this purpose, he regrouped most of his troops into 
a so-called Western Route Army (Hsi-lu chuin) comprising about 
22,500 men.68 Only 700 survivors actually reached Urumchi.69 Along 
with a handful of them, he went to the Northern Shensi base area. His 
chief bargaining power thus lost, Chang was brought to trial in January 
of I937 and ordered to "study" until he had purged himself of his "incor- 
rect" ideas. In plain operational terms, the trial meant he end of Chang 
Kuo-t'ao as an active member of the Party leadership. A short ime later, 
on April 4, 1938, he left Yenan, and while in Wuhan he went over to 
the Kuomintang on April 17. He was then formally stripped of his Party 
positions and of his Party membership.70 One small consequence of 
Chang's trial deserves mention. In early April of 1937, about one hun- 
dred of Chang's officers who had been attending K'ang Ta (K'ang-Jih 
chiin-cheng tahsfieh-Anti-Japanese Military-Political College) in Yen- 
an, were said to be attempting a revolt. They were arrested but released 
soon after the war against Japan broke out.7' Although difficult to
verify, the report rings true because it is similar to other, verifiable 
incidents that demonstrate hat personal oyalty to one's commander 
is sometimes stronger than loyalty to more distant superiors. As re- 
66 Liu Po-ch'eng, "Huiku ch'ang-cheng" [Reminiscing about the Long March], 
Hsing-huo liao-yuan, III, I2. 
67 Chungkuo kung-nung, 466. 
68 Kuo, in FCYP, March i968, II5, and IS, July i968, 46. 
69See Li T'ien-huan, "Tsou-ch'u Ch'ilien shan" [Marching out of the Ch'ilien 
mountains], Hsing-huo liao-yiian, III, 442. 
70 Hsin-Hua lihpao, April 20, I938; cited by Kuo, in FCYP, November i968, ioi, 
and IS, February i969, 32. 
71 Kuo, in FCYP, April i968, io8, and IS, August i968, 46-47. 
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cently as i967, during the cultural revolution, this characteristic feature 
of a traditional society could still be observed. 
RESPITE IN NORTHERN SHENSI 
Soon after Mao eliminated Chang Kuo-t'ao, another potential rival 
returned to China on a Soviet plane from Moscow. Ch'en Shao-yii, 
one of the Bolsheviks, had been in Moscow since the early thirties as 
the representative ofthe Chinese Communist Party and as a member 
of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.2 Given his high posi- 
tions and his obviously close relations with leaders of the Soviet Com- 
munist Party, Ch'en might have been able to wrest supreme leadership 
of the Party in the Northern Shensi area from Mao. But he did not. 
The Political Bureau held a conference on December 9 through 13, 
1937, said to have been the largest since the Fifth Plenum in January 
of 1934, for the purpose of working out a strategy against the Japanese 
and of making preparations for the Seventh Party Congress.73 The 
conference also elected a new leadership. Mao's growing influence was 
evident. As the position of general secretary was abolished, Chang 
Wen-t'ien was reduced to being one of nine members of the newly 
formed Central Secretariat. The other eight members were Chang 
Kuo-t'ao, Chang Wen-t'ien, Ch'en Shao-yfi, Ch'en Yfin, Ch'in Pang- 
hsien, Chu Te, K'ang Sheng, and Mao Tse-tung. 
In July of 1938, the central government sponsored a People's Political 
Council in Hankow to which the Communists were invited to send 
delegates. Ch'en Shao-yii was one of the seven leaders who went to 
Hankow.74 The other six leaders were Ch'in Pang-hsien, Tung Pi-wu, 
Chou En-lai, Lin Po-ch'fi, Teng Ying-ch'ao (Mrs. Chou En-lai), and 
Wu Yfi-chang. The six were concurrently the leaders of the Party's 
newly-established Yangtze Bureau.75 Ch'en later returned to Yenan 
when Hankow was abandoned to the Japanese. 
Thus, during several crucial months, Mao's attempt o enhance his 
own influence within the Party leadership was aided by the temporary 
absence of Ch'en Shao-yfi, potentially his most dangerous rival, and 
72Kuo, in FCYP, August i968, 86, and IS, November i968, 35. Ch'en arrived in 
Yenan during the last days of October, I937. 
73 The congress would not be held until more than seven years later. 
74 Who's Who, 79- 
75 The China Weekly Review, Vol. 75 (July i6, i938), 238. This source was brought 
to my attention by Donald Klein. See also Who's Who, I39, 553-54, 587, and 653. Unlike 
the other six delegates, Chou En-lai was already in Hankow as the CCP representative 
with the central government. Kuo appears to be in error when, in FCYP, September 
i968, ii9, and IS, December i968, 40-4i, he lists Ch'en Shao-yfi, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Ho 
K'o-ch'fian, Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying, Teng Ying-ch'ao, and Li K'o-nung. 
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two others, Chou En-lai, and Ch'in Pang-hsien, from the Central 
Secretariat. Of the five remaining members, Chang Wen-t'ien had 
just been reduced in standing, and Chang Kuo-t'ao had been repri- 
manded. 
The historical ccident by which Mao was the first of the Long 
Marchers to reach the Northern Shensi base area and Chang Kuo-t'ao's 
armies were decimated also helped bolster his prestige in Northern 
Shensi. He also had now the advantage of having the largest number 
of troops under him. Perhaps of most help to Mao was the fairly peace- 
ful and compact nature of the Northern Shensi base area. Shortly after 
the Sian Incident in December of 1936, the central government ended 
its harassment campaigns against the Communists, and one of the 
consequences ofthis shift in policy was the lessening in importance of 
military matters, and hence of military officers, and the corresponding 
importance of primarily political matters. Put differently, within the 
Communist movement, he Party and Party affairs once again were 
of primary importance. This allowed Mao to apply his very consider- 
able powers of persuasion to other members of the Party leadership 
without having to defer to the wishes of military commanders. The 
compactness ofthe Northern Shensi base area provided for frequent 
face-to-face contacts among the leaders, an opportunity hat had not 
existed since at least the days of Kiangsi. 
The record shows that through astute personal diplomacy and an 
acute sense of the politically feasible, Mao managed to have his ideas 
translated into policy. The most crucial question for the Communists 
in this relatively peaceful period was their elationship with the Kuo- 
mintang. Even before the Sian Incident, which gave the Communists 
the much-sought-after national attention a d apparently a promise from 
the kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek of cooperation against he Japanese, 
Mao Tse-tung began to counsel a second United Front with the Kuo- 
mintang. Considering the harrowing ordeal the Long March veterans 
had just gone through, itwas remarkable that Mao was able to enlist 
the support of most Party leaders for his policy suggestion. Those who 
did not agree, principally Ch'en Shao-yfi, argued that the "bloc-within" 
policy of the first United Front should be adopted, on the grounds that 
the Kuomintang was incomparably stronger than the Communists 
and that it should, therefore, b  given supreme command over all forces 
fighting the Japanese. Mao's proposed policy of a "bloc without" pre- 
vailed, and the majority of Party leadership agreed with Mao that the 
Communists should retain sole control over their troops while coop- 
erating with the Kuomintang in a loose alliance. Ch'en Shao-yfi was 
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reprimanded and apparently ost whatever hopes he may have had of 
dislodging Mao from the supreme position within the Northern Shensi 
base area. 
A final factor in Mao's rise that needs to be mentioned was his grow- 
ing reputation as a writer of policy papers. In the same month in which 
the Sian Incident broke out, Mao wrote his "Strategic Problems of 
China's Revolutionary War," which was the first extensive program 
for resisting Japanese ncroachments in Northern China. When full- 
fledged hostilities broke out in July of 1937, Mao redoubled his literary 
efforts. Safely ensconced in his cave apartment inYenan, Mao devoted 
much of his time during the eight years of war to writing. Much of his 
published work provided the Communists with a broad perspective in
which their efforts were convincingly related to the total setting of the 
war against Japan. This major contribution to the war effort was un- 
doubtedly appreciated by many Communists and helped raise Mao's 
influence within the party leadership. 
It may well be argued, therefore, that Mao's influence, which, as we 
have seen, had risen appreciably during the interlude between the Long 
March and the war against Japan, continued to rise during the war 
to a degree comparable to that enjoyed by Stalin within the Soviet 
Communist Party. The available vidence does not support this assump- 
tion; on the contrary, it encourages an opposite thesis. 
THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 
The renewed entente with the central government and the war 
against Japan helped the Party to regain national prominence and may 
also have averted, as some Chinese specialists contend, the destruction 
of the Northern Shensi base area by government troops. But the war 
also imposed tremendous strains on Party unity and, more important 
for this study, molded relationships within the leadership that re- 
mained basically intact until the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
of the late sixties. 
Both conditions were brought about by the Communist leadership's 
decision to send most of its troops behind Japanese lines to establish 
base areas, to engage the people in the war, and to conduct guerrilla 
operations. Toward the end of the war, there were fourteen major 
base areas besides the Northern Shensi base area where Mao Tse-tung 
and the Party Central remained throughout the war. They were Shansi- 
Chahar-Hopei, Shansi-Suiyiian, Shansi-Hopei-Honan-Shantung, Shan- 
tung, North Kiangsi, Central Kiangsu, South Kiangsu, North Huai, 
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South Huai, Central Anhui, East Chekiang, Hupei-Honan-Anhui, 
Tung Chiang (the East River in Kwangtung), and Ch'iung Yai (the 
mountainous area on Hainan Island).76 
The rapid proliferation of these base areas, each having its own 
government and mass organizations, demanded an equally rapid in- 
crease in the size of Party membership, which had become wholly in- 
sufficient for the task of supervising the Party's vastly expanded activ- 
ities. This need as well as the strong demand for membership by 
people of all walks of life in these base areas resulted in the relaxation 
of standards of admission. With a nod to Marxist class analysis, the 
Party decreed that the probation period for workers and hired farm 
hands be completely eliminated, that for poor peasants and handicrafts- 
men it be one month, for revolutionary students, intellectuals, minor 
civil servants and white-collar workers, middle peasants, revolutionary 
soldiers three months, and for all others six months.77 As a result, the 
Party grew from about 40,000 at the beginning of the war to several 
hundreds of thousands in the first few years of the forties and continued 
to climb to i,200,000 at the end of the war. Lacking sufficient discipline, 
many of the new Party members engaged in activities that threatened 
to tear the Party apart. Liu Shao-ch'i, in his essay Lun tang-nei toucheng 
[On the Intra-Party Struggle] of I94I, complained that Party members 
tended "to engage in the intra-Party struggle unscrupulously or without 
observing organizational procedures, to befriend or attack comrades in 
an unprincipled way, provoking dissension, betraying or secretly 
scheming against comrades, or not speaking to a man's face, but speak- 
ing wildly behind his back, irresponsibly criticizing the Party, spread- 
ing unfounded opinions, circulating rumors, telling lies, and calumniat- 
ing others."78 The problem was compounded by the increasing isola- 
tion of base areas from one another. Although individuals could and 
did come and go from base areas, the Japanese blockades became in- 
creasingly effective. 
The danger of ill-disciplined members' undermining Party cohesive- 
ness was viewed with alarm by all members of the leadership. During 
the two-year cheng-feng campaign, formally started in February of 
1942, intensive training was introduced in all base areas, and unsuitable 
members were dismissed. In the headquarters base area in Northern 
Shensi, Mao Tse-tung and the Party Central established several schools 
76 Jenmin ch'upanshe, K'ang-lih chancheng shihch'i chiehfang ch'ii kaik'uang [A 
Sketch of Liberated Areas During the War Against Japan] (Peking I953), Map i. 
77 Ch'en Yfin, "How to be a good Communist Party member" (May 30, I939), in 
Boyd Compton, Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-44 (Seattle I952), 96-97. 
78 Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, 367. 
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designed to inculcate a common outlook and discipline among Party 
members and other cadres.79 
The cheng-feng campaign, as carried out by Mao Tse-tung himself 
in the Party's headquarters base area in Northern Shensi, had a second 
purpose. Mao wanted, in Stuart Schram's words, "to give to the ideo- 
logical consciousness ofparty members a special and characteristic 
quality directly inspired by Mao Tse-tung himself."80 One result was 
the beginning of veneration for Mao in the North Shensi base area. 
I do not think that personal vanity played a role in it, as some special- 
ists believe, but even if it did, it probably was secondary to Mao's con- 
cern with the problem of decentralization f decision-making within 
the Party leadership. 
As the various base areas became increasingly isolated from one an- 
other, much decision-making power had to be exercised by their 
politico-military leaders. Although radio contact and, to a much lesser 
extent, courier contact were maintained with the Party Central in 
Northern Shensi, these regional Party leaders had necessarily assumed 
wide powers of discretion. One consequence was the shifting of the 
initiative from Northern Shensi to the outer base areas. Forced by a 
harsh situation that did not allow leaders of these base areas to wait 
for detailed instructions from the Party Central, the regional eaders 
continually experimented with new institutions and functions of polit- 
ical and social control in the outer base areas. These new programs 
determined general policy directives from the Party Central rather 
than the other way around. Time and again, the leaders of the outer 
base areas took the initiative, and Mao Tse-tung and the Party Central 
had little choice but to sanction the faiis accomplis. For example, as 
early as March of 1938, Liu Shao-ch'i reported the formation i  the 
Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base area of a coalition leadership committee 
composed of army commanders, local government officials, heads of 
mass organizations, officials of the Communist Party and of other 
political parties and groupings. He also reported that occupational 
"national salvation associations" for businessmen, workers, farmers, 
and students had been formed several months earlier.8' Afterward, 
Mao Tse-tung and the Party Central approved such unified leadership 
committees, a  did Chiang Kai-shek's Military Affairs Committee. 
In that same month, the Political Bureau held a three-day confer- 
79These schools were the Central Party School, Yenan University, K'ang Ta, the 
Lu Hsiin Academy, the Natural Science Academy, and the Central Research Institute. 
80 Schram, 220. 
81 In my Liu Shao-ch'i and "People's War" (Lawrence, Kansas, I970). 
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ence in Yenan that dealt with the war situation and possible measures 
to improve the Communists' chances of engaging the people in the 
war against Japan. One of the measures the Political Bureau "sug- 
gested" was the creation of precisely such occupational federations.82 
The Kuomintang's "Program for the War of Resistance and National 
Development," adopted at its extraordinary national congress at 
Wuch'ang on March 29 through April I, I938, made virtually identical 
"suggestions."83 
The considerable d gree of autonomous decision-making power of 
Party leaders in the outer base areas was, on the whole, strengthened 
by the rapid increase in Party membership. The rowdy and undisci- 
plined nature of many novices, mentioned by Liu Shao-ch'i, was a 
threat o the interests of all leaders, whether in Yenan or in the outer 
base areas. Thus, as we have seen, all leaders ought o instill discipline 
by means of the cheng-feng campaign. But the very process of cheng- 
feng had also the inevitable consequence of strengthening theauthority 
of Party leaders in the outer base areas, much as it strengthened Mao's 
authority inthe Northern Shensi base area. The rapid expansion and 
turnover during the war resulted in the Party's being composed mainly 
of new members. Most of them did not join until after the outbreak 
of the war. Thus their personal commitments ofloyalty, friendship, 
and trust o other Party members, and, most important, tothe Party 
leaders, were shaped entirely by their experiences in the outer base 
areas. 
The predominant character of life in the outer base areas was mili- 
tary, and it was the principal shaper not only of the relations of Party 
members to their leaders, but also of the nature of leadership itself. 
Because most of the outer base areas were less secure than the Party's 
headquarters base area in Northern Shensi, and because they were 
constantly obliged to ward off the encircling Japanese and puppet 
troops, their leaders were preoccupied with military affairs. If this 
preoccupation could be interpreted as a danger to Party unity, such 
danger surely did not stem from any potential challenge to Party 
supremacy within the Communist movement by a united military 
command nor from a Communist version of warlordism. Throughout 
the war, the Communist forces were widely dispersed. In Eastern 
China, the New Fourth Army was led by Yeh T'ing and, after the 
82Ch'en Shao-yii, "San-yiieh chengchih chii huiyi ti tsungchieh" [Summary of the 
Political Bureau conference in March], cited by Kuo in FCYP, October i968, 97, and IS, 
January i969, 41. 
83 Kuo, in FCYP, October i968, ioo, and IS, January i969, 45. 
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Southern Anhui Incident of January of 1941, by Ch'en I, who had 
been left behind in 1934 when the First Front Army evacuated the 
Central Soviet Area in Kiangsi. In Northern China, the Eighth Route 
Army was divided into three divisions, each having its separate theater 
of operations: the ii5th under Lin Piao, the 120th under Ho Lung, 
and the 129th under Liu Po-ch'eng and Hsi! Hsiang-ch'ien.84 
More important, as long-time Party members, the politico-military 
leaders of outer base areas were too firmly committed to the idea of 
Party supremacy. They also were not, with a few minor exceptions, 
the products of military academies and hence were not imbued with 
the esprit de corps characteristic of professional military officers. They 
were realistic enough to know that even if they had planned to carve 
out their personal warlord preserves after the war (a highly improb- 
able contingency, in my opinion), their ultimate enemy, the central 
government, would have had little difficulty in defeating them one 
by one. 
The potential obstacle in the path toward complete unity of the 
Party's leadership under Mao's unchallengeable control after the war 
was less dramatic and less tangible. During the war against Japan, the 
leaders of each base area formed small cohesive groups that changed 
little in membership during a long period (eight years) and shared 
extraordinary hardships. The cohesiveness and the length of time, if 
not the degree of hardship, were unprecedented in the history of Chi- 
nese Communism. They were the ingredients of clusters of friendship, 
trust, and loyalty that were to persist long after the war. 
The effects of the war could be seen not only in the nature but also 
in the composition of the leadership. The Political Bureau had prob- 
ably consisted of thirteen men in 1937. They were Chang Kuo-t'ao, 
Chang Wen-t'ien, Ch'en Shao-yii, Ch'en Yiin, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Chou 
En-lai, Hsiang Ying, Jen Pi-shih, Li Fu-ch'un, Li Wei-han, Liu Shao- 
ch'i, Mao Tse-tung, and Wang Chia-hsiang. All but Hsiang Ying 
were assembled in the Northern Shensi base area at the end of I937.8 
When the Communists convened their Seventh Party Congress in 
Yenan between April 23 and June ii, 1945, and elected thirteen mem- 
bers to a new Political Bureau, eight of its former thirteen members 
failed to be reelected. Hsiang Ying had been killed in the South Anhui 
84Lin Piao was not in actual command of the II5th Division during most of the 
war. Because he had been wounded early in the war, he spent some time in the Soviet 
Union for treatment and appeared to have resided with Mao in Yenan until the end 
of the war. 
85 Hsiang Ying had been left behind in the former Central Soviet Area in Kiangsi 
(see above). 
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Incident in January of 194i and Chang Kuo-t'ao was ousted from the 
Party in 1938. But six other members of the Political Bureau who were 
alive and Party members in good standing also failed to be included 
in the new Political Bureau, for one reason or another. Ch'en Shao-yii 
and Ch'in Pang-hsien had been Bolsheviks and general secretaries of 
the Party. As such, they had been Mao's rivals and, at times, opponents, 
as shown earlier in this study. They spent most of the war under Mao's 
domination in the North Shensi base area. At election time during the 
Seventh Party Congress, they not only failed to remain in the Political 
Bureau, they just barely managed to get into the Central Committee. 
They ranked forty-third and forty-fourth out of forty-four members. 
Another Bolshevik, Wang Chia-hsiang, fared even worse; he was 
elected merely as an alternate member of the Central Committee.86 
Ten Pi-shih and Li Fu-ch'un were elected as fifth and fourteenth mem- 
bers of the Central Committee. The last man in this group, Li Wei- 
han, failed to be elected as member or alternate member of the Central 
Committee.87 
The eight men who were added to the Political Bureau at the Seventh 
Party Congress were Chu Te, K'ang Sheng, Lin Po-ch'ii, Lin Piao, 
P'eng Chen, P'eng Te-huai, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and Tung Pi-wu. If we 
look at their whereabouts during the war, we discover that the first four 
spent most of their time with Mao in the North Shensi base area, and 
the last four elsewhere. Almost all of them travelled for short periods 
away from their places of assignment, but this does not seriously de- 
tract from a remarkable balance between, as it were, Yenan and non- 
Yenan leaders. This balance cannot easily be dismissed as accidental, 
because the entire new Political Bureau was likewise evenly divided 
into Yenan and non-Yenan leaders as follows (numbers denote rank- 
ings) :88 
Yenan Non-Yenan 
i. Mao Tse-tung 2. Liu Shao-ch'i 
4. Chu Te 3. Chou En-lai 
5. Ch'en Yfin 9. Tung Pi-wu 
6. Chang Wen-t'ien ii. P'eng Te-huai 
7. K'ang Sheng 12. P'eng Chen 
8. Lin Po-ch'ii I3. Teng Hsiao-p'ing 
io. Lin Piao 
86 He became a full member in March of I949. 
87 J have no adequate explanation for Li's sensationally precipitous decline in ranking. 
88 Who's Who, 705. The inclusion of Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-p'ing may be er- 
roneous because it is generally believed that they were elected to the Political Bureau 
not until the Fifth Plenum in April of I955. However, this possible error does not alter 
the balance between "Yenan" and "non-Yenan" leaders. 
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Moreover, a similar balance resulted in the five-man Central Secre- 
tariat, which was composed of the leaders with the top five rankings 
in the Political Bureau. 
Liu's rise to his high ranking was exceptionally rapid and particu- 
larly significant. As we have seen, he had been a member of the Polit- 
ical Bureau since before the Long March, but his influence within 
the Party leadership on the eve of the war against Japan was undoubt- 
edly less than that of Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, or even Chu Te. 
Liu had spent most of the war behind enemy lines in his capacity as 
leader of all Communists in "White" areas. He may, therefore, be 
looked upon as Mao's counterpart, with Mao in charge of the Party 
Central and Liu in charge of the Japanese-held areas. Inasmuch as most 
outer base areas were surrounded by the Japanese-held areas, they had 
close contact with Communist underground organizations there. It 
was Liu Shao-ch'i who supervised hundreds of such organizations and 
who appointed their leaders, many of whom would later rise to high 
positions in the Party. Because of the relations between outer base areas 
and Japanese-held areas and of Liu's work, he probably also had con- 
siderable influence in the outer base areas. Thus, by the time of the 
Seventh Party Congress, Liu had become the top spokesman for the 
outer base areas as well as for the Communist underground organiza- 
tions in Japanese-held areas. 
The composition of the new leadership, as expressed in the balance 
in the Political Bureau and the Central Secretariat, pointed to the 
paramount tasks of the Party in the postwar period, as these tasks 
were perceived by the leadership itself. The Party Constitution, adopted 
at the Seventh Party Congress, announced the beginning of an "anti- 
imperialist, anti-feudal, new-democratic revolution of the masses under 
the leadership of the proletariat" in which the Party's most urgent task 
was to "organize and unify the Chinese workers, peasants, petty bour- 
geoisie, intelligentsia, nd all anti-imperialist and anti-feudal elements 
and national minorities on its side." This was a tall order. Although 
the Party had grown strong during the War and had an estimated 
ninety million people under control in its many base areas, the ultimate 
enemy-the central government-seemed to be incomparably stronger. 
The Party Constitution warned that there was little hope of getting 
back to the cities soon and that "it will be preeminently important o 
consolidate the villages as revolutionary bases and it will also be neces- 
sary for the Party to undergo a long period of patient work among 
the popular masses."89 In other words, the preparations for the ultimate 
89 Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, 422-23. 
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struggle with the central government had to be made precisely in those 
areas and in those techniques of which the leaders of the outer base 
areas, and preeminently Liu Shao-ch'i, had accumulated an intimate 
knowledge. Liu Shao-ch'i and the other "non-Yenan" leaders also had 
the loyalty of thousands of Communist underground cadres in those 
areas. The Party needed these assets badly if it were to win out over 
the central government. 
On the other hand, Mao Tse-tung possessed neither the knowledge 
of conditions in Northern and Eastern China nor the personal ties 
with the Communist cadres there. But he supplied another most im- 
portant ingredient for victory, namely, himself as the symbol of a 
purposeful, united, and invincible party. By calling him a symbol, 
I do not wish to imply that Mao had no influence. He did not have 
his own military units, as the leaders of outer base areas had, but he 
did enjoy unrivaled prestige in the headquarters area of Northern 
Shensi. His contribution as symbol lay in the fact that in the relative 
tranquility ofhis cave apartment in Yenan, Mao had written several 
major essays, such as Maotun lun [On Contradiction] in 1937, Chung- 
kuo koming ho Chungkuo kungch'antang [The Chinese Revolution 
and the Chinese Communist Party] in I939, and Hsin minchu-chuyi 
lun [On The New Democracy] in 1940.90 
These writings helped to support he claim made by the Party Con- 
stitution adopted by the Seventh Party Congress that "the Chinese Com- 
munist Party takes the theories of Marxism-Leninism and the unified 
thought of the practice of the Chinese revolution, the thought of Mao 
Tse-tung, asthe guideline for all of its actions."91 This bold statement 
putting Mao on a par with Marx and Lenin grew not from the leaders' 
acknowledgment of Mao as a great heoretician oras the unchallenge- 
able leader of the Party, but from their belief that such elevation of 
Mao would help the Communist cause in the impending struggle 
with the central government. The primary purpose of exalting Mao 
at this critical juncture in the history of Chinese Communism was 
to convince the Chinese people that in the contest between the Com- 
munists and the nationalists, Mao was a more deserving leader than 
was Chiang Kai-shek. To the small but politically highly important 
urban intellectual, political, and commercial e ites, Mao was presented 
as the shaper of a by now thoroughly Chinese ideology that promised 
90 Mao was a most prolific writer during the war. Two entire volumes of the four- 
volume Mao Tse-tung hsiUanchi [Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung] (Peking i964) con- 
tain sixty-six selections said to have been written between July of I937 and the Seventh 
Party Congress in April of I945. 
91 Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, 422. 
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both the comfort of a well-ordered society and the hope of a dynamic 
future. To the common people, especially to the more tradition-bound 
older people, Mao was presented as a man worthy of becoming the 
new "king" who had the ability to create harmony between heaven 
and earth. 
In sum, the chief significance ofthe Seventh Party Congress was 
the coalition ature of the Party leadership. Itwas an alliance between 
Mao, the symbol of the "wave of the future," and the leaders of the 
outer base areas, and especially Liu Shao-ch'i, who with their military 
forces and their political and organizational know-how ere to make 
this "wave" a reality. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study has attempted to show that the principal characteristic 
of the Chinese Communist movement between 1930 and 1945 was the 
lack of centralized control in the Party and the military. Only from 
the end of 1936 to about September of I937 was there indisputably 
unified control over these two organizations. Before 1936, Party leaders 
were commanding their own troops and their own base areas. The 
troops were subsumed under the so-called Chinese Workers' and Peas- 
ants' Red Army, and the base areas were theoretically commanded by 
the Central Bureau for the Soviet Areas. Both organizations, however, 
were largely illusory in the sense that they had no actual control over 
all troops and all base areas. As we have seen, the Central Bureau for 
the Soviet Areas had sufficient control over the Central Soviet Area in 
Southern Kiangsi to expel from the Party the leaders of the Fut'ien 
rebellion. There is no evidence, however, that this bureau influenced 
other base areas beyond the point he leaders of those base areas deemed 
appropriate. Likewise, the headquarters of the Chinese Workers' and 
Peasants' Red Army had actual command over the First Front Army 
so long as it was attached to that army. This command erived wholly 
from the fact that the army's commander and political commissar 
were concurrently holding the same posts in the First Front Army. 
The sphere of the headquarters' actual authority did not extend to 
the two other front armies nor perhaps even to the smaller military 
units cattered throughout Southern China. When after the Maoerhkai 
Conference the headquarters was transferred to the Fourth Front 
Army, its influence probably ceased altogether, because Chang Kuo- 
t'ao, as the leader of the largest military unit, was unlikely to accept 
orders from anyone. 
Two major immediate factors probably accounted for the lack of 
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centralized control in both the Party and the military. One was the 
geographical dispersal of leaders and the other was the lack of con- 
sensus among them on several political and military issues. A more 
fundamental factor strengthening theeffects of geographical dispersal 
and sharpening the divisions of opinion was what I call the traditional- 
istic syndrome. 
Its main components were a particularistic world-view, personalized 
organizational transactions, and ascriptive personnel criteria. As in 
many other traditional societies, in rural China of the thirties and 
forties a man's world-view as restricted toa fairly small geograph- 
ical sphere where he came into frequent face-to-face ontacts with 
those to whom he was bound by friendship, loyalty, responsibility, 
obligation, love, or some other elation. These relations were typically 
focused on organizations like the village, the local district, he family 
(conjugal and extended), the school, or some local peasant or handi- 
craft association. 
This particularistic world-view had been very much weakened in 
the cities but even there it always remained strong enough to influence 
organizational transactions. The more personalized an organization 
was, the more efficient its transactions were. To put it concretely, in
national organizations such as the central government, political parties, 
trade unions, and the like, it was particularistic relations more than 
the impersonal codes of bureaucratic hierarchy ora common allegiance 
to some abstract principles that determined the degree of cohesion of 
these organizations. 
The Kuomintang, its government, and its armed forces, like other 
national organizations, exemplified this phenomenon. Throughout 
the period under consideration, factions that were determined by par- 
ticularistic factors operated within the larger, impersonal national 
organizations. The so-called C. C. clique, the Kwangsi generals, and 
the Whampoa graduates are three out of innumerable examples. Like- 
wise, people were hired, fired, promoted, and demoted not so much 
according to the formal criteria of merit but on the basis of membership 
in one or several particularistic groups. The presence and influence 
of the traditionalistic syndrome in the thirties and forties are too well 
known to be seriously called into question. 
The crucial question is whether the leaders of the Chinese Commu- 
nist Party, born, raised, and operating in this society, could have en- 
tirely escaped from the influences ofthe traditionalistic syndrome. The 
answer must be, I think, an emphatic no. The Chinese Communists 
could not have willed a total divorce from the societal influences that 
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had been continuously shaping their thoughts and actions. They also 
could not have wished to cut themselves off from these influences be- 
cause the chances for their success and ultimate victory intimately de- 
pended on an almost symbiotic relation with the society at large. In 
other words, the "fish-in-water" guerrilla principle was not merely a
military tactic but a sociopolitical stratagem. 
Yet the image of a quasi-collective leadership, as espoused by many 
China specialists, ineffect denies uch a natural and necessary relation. 
It posits that while the traditionalistic syndrome continued to influence 
all other political organizations inthe country, itplayed no significant 
part in the nature of the Party's leadership. On the contrary, the image 
portrays a leadership remarkably similar to those of highly bureauc- 
ratized countries. Here is the perfectly p ramidal hierarchy, so familiar 
to us in North America, Japan, and Europe, and the delight of every 
student of public administration, governing a party fighting for sur- 
vival in the backwoods of China. We are told, without any hard evi- 
dence, that some time between 1930 and 1945, one man, Mao Tse-tung, 
was actually the sole and unchallengeable leader of the entire Com- 
munist Party. The word of this leader of the Party since Tsunyi al- 
legedly was accepted by everyone. Hard evidence and possibly correct 
suggestions tothe contrary have not altered this image. To cite only 
two examples, Mao's inability at Maoerhkai to prevail over Chang 
Kuo-t'ao and his ratifying rather than initiating of major policies dur- 
ing the war have had no remedial effect on the idea that Mao has 
been the leader since Tsunyi. 
I hope that this brief study has demonstrated that the image of a 
quasi-collective leadership is seriously flawed. First, it rests heavily on 
an interpretation of the Tsunyi Conference that is not backed up by 
evidence. As I have shown, an examination of the sources used by 
Jerome Ch'en, the only person who has sought o support his inter- 
pretation of that conference, reveals nothing of substance. Second, it 
appears to be influenced by our knowledge of the nature of leaderships 
in societal contexts sharply different from those surrounding the Chi- 
nese Communists between 1930 and 1945. Third, it ignores the strong 
probability hat the leaders were significantly influenced by the tradi- 
tionalistic syndrome of the society in which they operated. 
Of course, no one is apt to argue seriously that he Party's leaders were 
as strongly influenced by this syndrome aswere the rustic denizens of 
Southern Kiangsi or Northern Shensi. The leaders professed hostility 
to tradition and saw themselves a the most modernized political elite 
in China. They may have been right, but this is not the same as say- 
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ing that they had in fact escaped completely from their traditional 
background and environment. 
This study has viewed the Party leadership as genuinely collective 
in the sense that several of its members had roughly equal influence 
in the entire Party. This view of a collective l adership isbased on the 
conviction that the traditionalistic syndrome had been an important 
determinant ofthe nature of the Party leadership between 1930 and 
1945. I believe that a brief recapitulation fthe material presented in 
this study will confirm this interpretation. 
The Bolsheviks had formed close ties as schoolmates inMoscow. This 
particularistic bond was reinforced by their personal ties to Pavel Mif, 
their mentor in Moscow and guardian on their return trip to China, 
and sustained by the mandate placed upon them by the Comintern to 
seize control of the party. This exceedingly difficult task had to be 
undertaken i a piecemeal manner because the Party was geographi- 
cally dispersed. The Bolsheviks, therefore, first concentrated ontaking 
over the central organizations such as the Central Committee, the 
Political Bureau, and the Secretariat, all of which were located in 
Shanghai at the time. Essentially, they accomplished this task by I93I. 
The Bolsheviks could have captured the de facto control of the entire 
Party at the same time if the Party had been a modern organization, 
since leadership of a modern organization can generally expect to 
have its policies and orders accepted and carried out in a routine fashion 
by all members regardless of geographical dispersal. Because the Chi- 
nese Communist Party was not a modern organization, geographical 
dispersal did prevent the Bolsheviks from automatically extending their 
authority from the Party Central to the various base areas. 
A second obstacle was the growth of particularistic relationships in 
the base area themselves. The leaders of the Central Soviet Area and 
of the Western Hunan-Hupei and Hupei-Honan-Anhui base areas had 
formed their own groups all of whom, Bolsheviks and base area leaders, 
shared an ideology and a commitment to their revolution. In other 
words, their world-view contained a commitment toabstractions that 
bridged geographical distances. But all of them were, to various de- 
grees, still products of a traditional society. Their particularistic bonds 
of loyalty, trust, and friendship, forged under conditions of extreme 
danger and hardships in close groups of leaders in each base area, 
proved too strong to allow a common commitment to extend from 
abstractions to centralized control. As we have seen, the sphere of 
actual control of smaller organizations, such as the headquarters of 
the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the Central Bureau 
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for the Soviet Areas, likewise did not extend beyond the groups to 
which they were attached. 
If the traditionalistic syndrome was responsible, as I think it was, 
for the lack of centralized control during the Kiangsi period, it was 
even more so during the Long Marches because more than ever the 
several Communist groups were isolated from one another and each 
was facing on its own grave dangers and hardships. As the agenda of 
the Tsunyi Conference shows, the leaders of the First Front Army 
did not discuss abstract ideals nor Party-wide problems but only con- 
crete political and military problems facing them alone. 
The clearest manifestation f the power of the traditionalistic syn- 
drome occurred at the Lianghok'ou and Maoerhkai Conferences. Had 
the Party been a modern organization i  which, inter alia, one man 
had, by virtue of his formal rank, undisputed and unchallengeable 
control, the two front armies would have marched under Mao towards 
Northern Shensi. They did not because two groups faced each other 
whose particularistic bonds within each group proved stronger than 
the common commitment to abstract ideals. 
The brief respite between the Long Marches and the war against 
Japan was the only time between I930 and I945 when most Party 
leaders were assembled in one place under relatively peaceful condi- 
tions. It was during this time that we can for the first ime speak con- 
fidently of Mao's pre-eminence in the base area in Northern Shensi. 
Various contemporaneous journalistic a counts, of which Edgar Snow's 
Red Star Over China has been by far the most influential, projected 
an image of a quasi-collective leadership. I think that, on the whole, 
such a term is an accurate description fthe leadership nI936 and I937. 
With the onset of the war, however, the leadership became collec- 
tive once again. As this study has shown, within the widely dispersed 
collective l adership, a rough division of labor slowly emerged. As the 
war wore on, this division of labor was more and more directed to- 
ward the postwar period and the ultimate struggle against he central 
government. In the Party's headquarters inNorthern Shensi, Mao Tse- 
tung formulated a series of policy papers and theoretical essays that 
formed the basis for the statement, made by the entire Party leader- 
ship at the Seventh Party Congress in I945, that the Communists were 
better qualified than the Nationalists to lead China toward internal 
unity and external sovereignty. This does not mean, however, that 
Mao had in fact become the single unchallengeable ader of the 
Party. The leaders of the outer base areas and Liu Shao-ch'i, who had 
been in charge of creating an underground Party infrastructure in 
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the "White" areas, had both the military power and the politico- 
organizational skill in Northern and Eastern China without which 
the Party could not hope to replace the central government as supreme 
ruler of China. It is unlikely that Mao had actually ascended to a pre- 
eminent position of influence in the Party during the war because of 
the essential interdependence of Mao, Liu, and the leaders of the 
outer bases. It is also unlikely because, as this study has suggested, Liu 
and the outer-base leaders had become the nuclei of strong particu- 
laristic bonds. The result was a fine balance, firmly grounded in a 
common ideology and directed against a common enemy, between 
Mao Tse-tung and his group in Yenan, on one hand, and Liu Shao- 
ch'i and the leaders in outer base areas and elsewhere, on the other 
hand. 
Some Western scholars, accustomed to dealing with perfectly py- 
ramidal hierarchies, may find the indeterminate nature of a truly 
collective leadership unnatural or uncomfortable. But if this study has 
achieved its purpose, it has demonstrated that during the formative 
period from I930 to I945, the Party's leadership was in fact collective. 
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